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Local Property Tax Limitations vs. School District
Employee Pension Costs in Pennsylvania
William T. Hartman and Timothy J. Shrom
William T. Hartman is Professor in the Educational Leadership
Program in the College of Education at Pennsylvania State
University where he teaches courses in school finance, school
district budgeting, and financial modeling. His present research
focuses on understanding the impact of the current economic
crisis–the “new fiscal reality”–on school districts.
Timothy J. Shrom has served the past 32 years as Business
Manager of the Solanco School District in Quarryville,
Pennsylvania. He is a past President of the Pennsylvania
Association of School Business Officials and a leading expert
on school funding, health care, and innovative cost-saving
practices in the state.

Introduction
In Pennsylvania as in many other states, employee pension
costs are a significant source of financial pressure for school
districts (Zeehandelaar and Northern 2013, Pennsylvania
Public Employees’ Retirement Commission 2013). In order to
gain greater insight into the nature of Pennsylvania school
districts’ financial burden related to pension commitments,
this article presents the findings of two scenarios, one which
compared the maximum amount of local property tax
revenue Pennsylvania school districts could raise under a 2010
state property tax limitation statute, Act 120,1 to their pension
obligations; and a second scenario which incorporated a 1%
annual salary increase into the analysis. The article is divided
into three sections. The first provides the fiscal context for this
study. This is followed by a description of the methodology
used in the study and the presentation of findings. The third,
and final, section presents conclusions.
The Fiscal Context for Pennsylvania School Districts
In the years prior to the Great Recession of 2007-2009,
state and local revenues in Pennsylvania were increasing
moderately along with the economy while school district
expenditures were increasing at relatively low and predictable
rates. However, the national economic crisis brought about
a new budget climate, one for which many Pennsylvania
school district administrators and boards were largely
unprepared, fiscally or attitudinally. State aid was slashed,
and local revenues were limited or reduced by the downturn
in the economy. Prior fiscal trends and historical operational
processes offered little guidance with regard to how reestablish and maintain fiscal stability. Districts were forced to
make substantial changes in their fiscal and programmatic
operations. In order to balance their budgets, Pennsylvania
school districts had to make significant reductions in key
expenditure areas such as instruction and operations.
Even prior to the economic recession, Pennsylvania school
districts were facing fiscal challenges as the result of Act 1, a
state law enacted in 2006 which imposed local property tax
limitations on school districts.2 Then, in 2010, shortly after
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the official end of the Great Recession, Act 120 dramatically
increased school districts’ mandatory pension contributions.
On the revenue side, there was a dramatic change in
districts’ ability to control local taxes with the implementation
of Act 1. Prior to its enactment, school boards could raise local
property tax rates with a majority vote of the board. Under
Act 1, school districts were limited in raising their tax rates
to an inflationary index that was the average of the percent
increase in the Pennsylvania statewide average weekly wage
and the federal employment cost index for elementary and
secondary schools. This rate was adjusted upward for less
property-wealthy school districts, allowing them to raise their
tax millage. Between 2007 and 2012, the base index fell from
a high of 4.4% in 2009 to a low of 1.4% in 2012, while the
average adjusted index fell from a high of 5.7% in 2009 to a
low of 1.8% in 2012. (See Table 1.)
Property taxes are the major revenue source under the
control of the local school boards in Pennsylvania. In 2012,
they made up 79% of all local revenues collected and 46%
of total revenues received by districts in Pennsylvania. By
contrast, state aid to school districts represented 36% of
school district revenue although the state aid share per
district varied from 10% to 78% depending upon the school
district’s property wealth (Pennsylvania Department to
Education n.d.a). Consequently, constraints on property tax
rates increases can affect a school district’s ability to balance
its budget.
The fiscal condition of Pennsylvania’s public school
employees’ pension system is like that of many other states
in that it has large unfunded pension liabilities (Pennsylvania

Public Employees’ Retirement Board 2013).3 Over several
decades, the obligations to current and future recipients have
been substantially underfunded, forcing a massive catch-up
effort (Pennsylvania Office of the Budget 2012). A combination
of economic conditions and political decisions led to the
need for large increases in state and district payments into
the pension fund (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 2012).
In 2010, Act 120 re-amortized the unfunded liabilities and
established controlled, but sharply increasing district required
contribution levels rising to over 30% of salaries by 2019
and continuing at that level through 2035 (Public School
Employees’ Retirement Board 2013).
District pension contributions are calculated in terms of an
employer contribution rate, which represents a percentage
of district employee salaries. Each year, school districts make
a mandated payment into the PSERS fund based on this
required rate. The most recent employer contribution rates for
PSERS and the annual and cumulative percentage increases
they represent are shown in Table 2. Beginning in 2012, the
rates started a steep annual climb to reach 29.15% by 2018.
Annual percentage increases began at 53% in 2012, but will
decline to 3% by 2018. However, cumulatively, districts will
see a 417% increase in their mandated pension contributions
between 2011 and 2018.
For most districts, the state share of this expenditure is
approximately 50%, so while the percentage increases to
districts will be the same as shown in Table 2, the dollar
amount is shared with the state. The district’s pension
contribution has to be covered local property tax revenues,
other local revenues, and other state subsidies. District

Table 1 | Base Index and Adjusted Indices: 2007-2015
Year
Base Index (%)

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

3.9

3.4

4.4

4.1

2.9

1.4

1.7

1.7

2.1

Adjusted Index (%)
Minimum (%)

3.9

3.4

4.4

4.1

2.9

1.4

1.7

1.7

2.1

Average (%)

5.0

4.4

5.7

5.3

3.8

1.8

2.2

2.2

2.7

Maximum (%)

6.3

5.5

7.1

6.7

4.7

2.3

2.8

2.8

3.4

Table 2 | PSERS Employer Contribution Rates for Mandatory District Pension Payments as a Percentage of
District Employee Salaries: 2011-2018
Year

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

5.64

8.65

12.36

16.93

21.31

25.80

28.30

29.15

Annual Increase (%)

53

43

37

26

21

10

3

Cumulative Increase (%)

53

119

200

278

357

402

417

PSERS Employee
Contribution Rate (%)
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Table 3 | Total School District Payments for
Pension Contributions: 2011-2018
Year

District Contribution ($)

2011

295,782,380

2012

439,922,497

2013

631,749,050

2014

873,985,965

2015

1,111,097,892

2016

1,358,657,385

2017

1,505,213,335

2018

1,565,927,152

pension contributions range from $295.8 million in 2011
to $1.57 billion in 2018. (See Table 3.) Practically speaking,
pension costs act as a prior obligation in the school district
budgeting process; that is, before other components of the
budget can be considered, districts must budget for pension
costs.
Methodology
The purpose of this study was to compare the property
tax revenue that districts could raise using their maximum
allowable Act 1 property tax rates to their state-mandated
pension costs. Then, the analysis was extended to include
the impact of an annual 1% increase in district salaries. The
school district was the unit of analysis, and the time period
for the study was 2011-2018. The data source for 2011 and
2012 district revenues and expenditures was the Pennsylvania
Department of Education. These data were also used as a basis
to develop projections for 2013 through 2018.
Three district data sets were compiled for each year of
this study: (1) Maximum local property taxes that districts
could raise under the state property tax limitation; (2)
Mandated district pension obligations; and (3) District salary
expenditures with an annual 1% salary increase. The analysis
first focused on comparing allowable annual increases in
property tax revenues against annual pension costs faced by
the districts, and then it focused on the impact of pension
costs plus and an annual one percent increase in salaries.
The maximum increase in local property taxes that a
school board is allowed to levy is established by the annual
inflationary index of Act 1. As shown in Table 1, the base index
was 1.7% in 2013 and 2014, and it is set to rise to 2.1% for
2015. For relatively property-poor school districts, an adjusted
index, which increases their allowable index, is calculated by
the Pennsylvania Department of Education. Consequently,
the average adjusted index across all districts is higher:
2.2% in 2013 and 2014, and 2.7% in 2015. The Pennsylvania
Independent Fiscal Office (IFO) has projected base indices
between 2.3% and 2.4% out to 2017 (Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania 2012). Future estimated adjusted indices were
Educational Considerations
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calculated for each district using the IFO future estimates
of the base Act 1 indices for each future year and applying
the Pennsylvania Department of Education formula for
adjustments for poorer districts.
The data source for 2010-2012 current and interim property
taxes collected by school districts was the Pennsylvania
Department of Education. For 2013-2018, the authors
estimated the annual maximum property tax revenue by
increasing the prior year’s amount by the district’s adjusted
index times the prior year’s amount. The difference between
the new total property tax amount and the prior year’s
amount was the maximum increase in property tax allowable
for the district. These calculations set an upper bound on the
increase in property taxes available to districts. However, not
all school boards choose to increase taxes to the maximum
level. In practice, only half of the districts raised their property
taxes to the maximum in 2012 in spite of the state revenue
shortfall.
The calculations for the annual expenditure increases for
pension commitments and salaries followed a similar process.
The data source for 2010-2012 salaries was the Pennsylvania
Department of Education. Future annual salary increases were
estimated at 0.5% for 2013 and 1.0% for the remaining years.
PSERS rates for the years of the study were shown in Table
2. Annual calculations were made for each district’s net dollar
pension cost by multiplying the total salary amount by the
PSERS rate and then halving it. The annual cost increase for
pensions was determined by subtracting one year’s cost for
pensions from the prior year.
Finally, for each year, the PSERS net dollar increase to
districts was subtracted from the maximum allowable increase
of property taxes to compare the two amounts. Districts with
a negative balance had a larger increase in pension costs for
that year than the school board’s authority to raise property
taxes. Districts that had larger increases in property tax
revenues than pension cost increases had a positive balance;
that is, some property tax revenues remained for use in other
areas of the budget. The annual number of districts in each
category was then determined. In addition to an annual
analysis, a cumulative analysis was conducted.
Findings
Figure 1 shows the number of districts with positive and
negative balances after subtracting pension obligations,
even after the school district levied the maximum allowable
property tax rate. The numbers of negative and positive
districts show a changing pattern over the eight years
of the study. In 2011, approximately 85% of districts had
positive balances. However, between 2012 and 2014, the
percentage of school districts with negative balances grew
steadily, from 41% to 68%, as the maximum property tax
rate increase allowed declined from 3.8% to 2.2%. At the
same time, pension contribution rates rose from 5.64% to
16.93% of salaries. The percentage of districts with negative
balances peaked in 2014, and, from that point forward, the
pattern was projected to reverse with the number of districts
with negative balances falling to zero in 2018. Even though
pension contribution rates were projected to rise during this
15
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Figure 1 | Annual Number of School Districts with Positive and Negative Balances after Subtracting
Pension Obligations: 2011-2018
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Figure 2 | Cumulative Number of School Districts with Positive and Negative Balances after Subtracting
Pension Obligations: 2011-2018
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period from 21.3% to 29.2%, the number of negative-balance
districts dropped steadily due to lower annual and cumulative
increases in the contribution rates, low salary increases, and
higher allowable property tax rates. Nevertheless, as late as
2016, more than one-third (38.7%) of school districts were
projected to have negative balances after meeting pension
obligations.
Next, a cumulative analysis was conducted to examine the
effects of property tax revenues and pension costs over time.
(See Figure 2.) Although only 15.4% of districts had negative
balances in 2011, the percentage more than doubled to 34.3%
16
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in 2015, but then declined to 21.4% in 2018. Even though the
cumulative effects of property tax increases are projected
to reduce the number of districts with negative balances
between 2015 and 2018, they are insufficient to move
approximately 20% of school districts to a positive balance.
The previous analyses held district salaries constant. This
scenario added the effect of an annual 1% salary increase. (See
Figure 3.) The percentage of school districts with negative
balances initially dropped by more than half between 2011
and 2012, from 43.9% to 19.2%. However, the percentage
of districts with negative balances then skyrocketed to
Vol. 41, No. 2, Spring 2014
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Figure 3 | Effect of Annual One Percent Salary Increase on the Number of School Districts with Positive
and Negative Balances after Subtracting Pension Obligations: 2011-2018
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99.2% in 2015; that is, 495 out of 499 school districts had
negative balances. The trend then reversed with only 46
school districts, or 9.2%, with negative balances in 2018. The
introduction of even a modest salary increase clearly made
the pattern of districts with negative and positive balances
much more volatile.
Figure 4 illustrates the cumulative effect of the addition
of an annual 1% salary increase. The effect, in general, was
less volatile, but, ultimately, it resulted in a negative balance
for more than one-third (33.9%) of school districts. Initially,
the percentage of districts with negative balances dropped
sharply from 43.9% in 2011 to 20.9% in 2012. However, the
percentage of districts with negative balances then rose to a
high of 41.9% in 2016 before falling a few percentage points
to 33.9% in 2018.
Conclusions
As the results of this study indicated, a number of
Pennsylvania school districts face a volatile financial future
as a result of recently enacted state laws related to property
tax limitations and pension commitments. Even if these
districts annually raise their local property tax rates to the
state-allowed maximum for each of the next five years, the
revenues will be insufficient to fund their mandated pension
contributions and still provide employees with a 1% annual
salary increase. Under these conditions, in order to balance
their budgets, these districts would have to: (1) use their fund
balance, if they have one (a short term tactic); (2) reduce and/
or eliminate programs and services; or (3) reduce personnel
expenditures, e.g., through attrition or furloughs. Also, it
Educational Considerations
Published by New Prairie Press, 2017

should be noted that even districts with positive balances
may still have insufficient revenues to address the remainder
of their budgeted expenditures.
In order for districts to balance their budgets, revenues
must be increased or expenditures must be reduced. On the
revenue side, both property-poor districts and propertywealthy districts are constrained. Property-wealthy school
districts rely primarily on local property taxes as their major
source of revenue. This source is limited to small annual
increases in the base index for the next five years. On the
other hand, property-poor districts receive the bulk of their
revenue from state subsidies. However, given recent history,
substantial increases in state funding are unlikely.4
Consequently, reduction in expenditures is the only
feasible approach for districts to balance their budgets. Of
the two expenditures used in this analysis–pension costs
and salary increases–districts have no flexibility with regard
pension payments since they are mandated by state law.
The only source of relief is through legislative action. Several
modifications to the current PSERS funding approach have
been proposed, but none has gained sufficient support for
approval by the legislature.
Salaries, on the other hand, are an expenditure over which
districts have some control or influence. Actions that districts
can take to reduce payroll costs include reducing the number
of employees through attrition or layoffs, or engaging in
collective bargaining for salary concessions or lower salary
levels. There is some evidence that this happened in 2012
following significant reductions in state funding.5 The fiscal
effects of these actions was evident in the latest available
17
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Figure 4 | Cumulative Effect of Annual One Percent Salary Increase on the Number of School Districts with
Positive and Negative Balances after Subtracting Pension Obligations: 2011-2018
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actual salary data in 2011-2012, where there was a 3%
reduction in salary expenditures over the prior year. This was
a result of both the reduction in personnel and other salary
actions, such as wage freezes by a number of districts.
This study considered only two of the critical expenditure
areas that school districts have to fund in order to maintain
their operations. For those districts facing negative balances
after making mandated pension contributions or pension
contributions plus a modest salary increase for staff, there are
no funds available for other areas of the budget, even those
that are mandated or essential to maintain. These include,
but are not limited to, mandated tuition payments to charter
schools,6 special education costs,7 and health care benefit
costs.
As each of these major expenditure areas is considered and
added to the budget requirements, it becomes increasingly
difficult for districts to balance their budgets. Looking at the
budget equation, there are serious difficulties on each side.
School district revenues are restricted or growing slowly due
to a continued weak economy. Many critical expenditures
are growing rapidly; significant ones are mandated by the
state or federal governments and are out of district control.
Other desirable, but not mandated, expenditures must be
reduced. This has already led to painful, controversial budget
reductions in staffing and programs in Pennsylvania. Given the
projections of a likely continuing structural imbalance over
the next five years, districts face the critical budget-balancing
task of fulfilling all their financial obligations and maintaining
the existing levels and quality of programs and services for
students.
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Endnotes
1
P.L. 1269, H.B. 2497, http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/
legis/li/uconsCheck.cfm?yr=2010&sessInd=0&act=120.
2

Act 1 of 2006, Special Session 1, P.L. 1873, No. 1.

The Pennsylvania Public School Employees’ Retirement
System (PSERS) is a guaranteed benefits system in
which school districts and the state have equal funding
responsibility. The state funds its portion of PSERS costs
through a subsidy to school districts.
3

State general aid revenues were cut by approximately $900
million in 2012 followed by small increases of 0.9% in 2013
and 2.3% in 2014, leaving districts more than $600 million
below what they received in 2011.
4

In a survey by two state administrator organizations, districts
identified reductions of approximately 20,000 positions over
a two year period, 2011-2012 and 2012-2013, in order to
balance their budgets (Pennsylvania Association of School
Business Officials (PASBO) and Pennsylvania Association of
School Administrators (PASA), “School District Cost Cutting
Continues for a Second Consecutive Year,” News Release
(October 2012), http://www.bpsd.org/Downloads/2012PASBO
FundingSurvey.pdf.
5

Pennsylvania school districts are required to fund 100% of
tuition payments to charter schools. The state subsidy to offset
approximately 25% of these costs was terminated in 2012.
6

State subsidies to school districts for special education have
not increased since 2008.
7
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